What do civil servants actually do? — Part Two: political impartiality
In this second blog in a series looking at the role of civil servants, I consider one of the key features of the UK civil service — political impartiality.
Political impartiality has been a key principle of the civil service since the famous Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854, the foundation document for the way civil servants should be appointed and should operate once in post. The report was commissioned to address failings in public administration driven by the practice of Ministers appointing friends or those who could buy their way into positions funded by the taxpayer. This meant that promotion had little link to talent so Northcote-Trevelyan recommended a system based on meritocracy, with examination on entry and open competition for progression. This established the idea of a professional civil service, driven by integrity, objectivity, and political impartiality so that officials would remain in post following an election, able to use their expertise and experience to serve the next Government.
But what does ‘political impartiality’ mean in practice to the modern civil servant?
Framing advice to Ministers
On the surface this is straightforward — I offered advice, performed tasks, and delivered on commitments in the same way regardless of the political persuasion of whoever sat in the Secretary of State’s chair. But it is obviously more sophisticated than that. Who my Minister was mattered because different people asked different questions, posed different challenges, and expected different types of responses. So it is automatically true that the advice I offered depended on who the Minister was and what they wanted to know.
To be clear, this does not mean I withheld unpalatable advice — civil servants throughout Whitehall will be able to recount tales of difficult meetings with Ministers when unwelcome information had to be given (sometimes to very angry reactions). But some issues were simply not relevant in the same way for different Ministers, even if the party in Government remained the same. And crucial to any conversation — particularly a difficult conversation — is building trust with Ministers, to show that you understand their priorities and desires and that you can find a way to deliver on them, even if the advice needs to be cut with the realism of negative consequences.
Importantly, this advice is not given from the perspective of right or wrong, but rather by being clear about practicality and consequence (both in terms of the actual impact of a decision as well as the likely reception by those affected and the wider public). It is essential to use evidence well and show a mastery of the range of views from within the system. It is also useful to have an understanding of the historical context, recognising that for many Ministers their stay in post will be relatively brief and they won’t have had time to delve into the evolution of systems or ideas. So civil servants need to be able to offer a wider context.
By framing advice in terms of what is possible, it allows space to suggest alternative approaches for Ministers to consider as well without them being seen as deliberately obstructive. This reflects a common misconception — that civil servants exist to frustrate Ministerial plans. I can hand-on-heart say that I never saw any evidence of this in my 19 years as a civil servant, although I can see why advice pointing out the practical effects of a policy might feel obstructive to a Minister determined to push an idea through, especially if driven by ideology.
To be really clear, this does not mean that civil servants always give Ministers exactly what they want. In fact, I suspect that if you asked most Ministers they would say the civil service is expert at providing briefing and advice on many things that those Ministers had little interest in or had no idea they needed to have an opinion on (see the first blog in this series on the nuts and bolts of how policy advice is given). And a fundamental part of the role is definitely ‘speaking truth unto power’ — telling Ministers the hard truths about the delivery of a policy idea that they might not like but nonetheless need to know. But that isn’t the same as being unresponsive to Ministerial needs and preferences, and the most effective way to ensure that negative implications are considered by Ministers is to do that from a position of credibility. A ‘No Minister’ from me would only work if that Minister was clear that it came from a place of real understanding and a commitment to delivering their overall agenda.
Civil servants advise, Ministers decide
Bernard Woolley : Well, I was just wondering if the minister was right, actually.
Sir Humphrey Appleby : Very unlikely. What about?
Bernard Woolley : About ends and means. I mean, will I end up as a moral vacuum too?
Sir Humphrey Appleby : Oh, I hope so, Bernard. If you work hard enough.
Bernard Woolley : I actually feel rather downcast. If it’s our job to carry out government policies, shouldn’t we believe in them?
Sir Humphrey Appleby : Huh, what an extraordinary idea.
In this infamous scene from Yes Minister, Sir Humphrey praises the idea of civil servants as a moral vacuum, celebrating the notion that belief is a hinderance to becoming an effective official. Yet, the idea that officials should have no political opinions is both ludicrous on a human level, and unhelpful on a practical level.
First, on a human level, civil servants will of course have their own political opinions. They can vote, join political parties, even take part in some political activities as long as they stay within the bounds of the civil service code. The critical thing is that personal political views do not colour advice, and that there is no public declaration of those views that could lead people — especially Ministers — to suspect the official is pushing a personal or partisan agenda.
Second, impartiality is not the same as agreement. The healthy functioning of Government relies on civil servants giving open and honest advice, and it is imperative that this is not confused with partiality. If a Minister wants to take forward a policy and the evidence gathered by an official does not support the Minister’s view, it is important that advice is given nonetheless. As mentioned above, this is not about saying a Minister is ‘wrong’ but rather saying that if such-and-such an idea is taken forward, the evidence suggests the following consequences and reactions. Let us be clear about that — partiality in this context would mean that a civil servant was putting advice forward in a specific away to advance a personal political agenda, not that an official suggests negative consequences to a possible policy decision. But there are — alas — times when Ministers do not feel this distinction.
Third, officials caring about the policy area they are responsible for is no bad thing. Imagine a world in which the people responsible for managing child protection didn’t care about children or those dealing with the armed forces didn’t care about military preparedness or success. We want officials to understand their policy areas, to have views on how to make things better, to understand where the weight of evidence points us. And we want officials to share that with Ministers, so that decisions can be based on the best available evidence and views. In a recent discussion hosted by the Institute for Government, the former Permanent Secretary of the Department for Education, Jonathan Slater, and for Secretary of State, Justine Greening, talk about the need for officials to give their own views on a topic, and the difficulties that can sometimes hinder that.
What becomes crucial at the end of the process is the principle that ‘officials advise, Ministers decide’. Once a Minister has made a decision, even if that is not one the official would have made personally, it nonetheless must be taken forward with alacrity.
Serving the Government of the day
This is one of the trickiest concepts to grasp, and one of the easiest to misconstrue. The civil service exists to take forward the policy decisions of the serving Government, and no civil servant should publicly criticise the policy of the Government in power at that time, and not just in their specific area of expertise.
This means that the advice given by civil servants remains secret and there are provisions in the Freedom of Information Act that ensure that official advice is never compromised by the fear of publication. It is therefore very possible for an official to have argued strongly against a particular policy decision based on the evidence and his or her judgement, and yet be expected to defend it vigorously in public. Serving the Government of the day should never mean ducking difficult conversations with Ministers or taking the political views of the serving Government as your own. But these are private matters, conversations, not to be shared publicly.
I have had the unnerving experience of being booed, slow hand-clapped, even hissed at when speaking in public about Government decisions, when the advice I gave to Ministers may have been completely contrary to the policy taken forward. This is part of the lot of being a civil servant, and it is important to accept this as the price for being able to give advice without fear or favour behind closed doors.
Special Advisers — SpAds
No discussion about political impartiality would be complete without a reflection on the role of Special Advisers — SpAds as they are known throughout Whitehall.
Again the theory behind their role is straightforward — SpAds exist to offer a partisan political view on advice for Ministers to consider. They are appointed directly by the Secretary of State (in practice with names agreed with №10) and report directly to her or him. They cannot give civil servants direction or obstruct civil servant advice.
What this theory fails to take account of is the human element.
First, it is important to acknowledge the wide variety in the backgrounds, skills, knowledge, and influence of SpAds. Some come into post with experience of the policy area they are working on (e.g. ex teachers become SpAds at the Department for Education), whereas others come from a more political background (e.g. suggested by the Party central office) and can view being a SpAd as a rung on the ladder to becoming an MP and then a Minister. There are lots of examples of these: David Cameron, David Miliband, Ed Balls, etc. So what SpAds contribute depends very much on their background, starting point, and ambitions.
Second, the relationship between the Secretary of State and his or her SpAds varies based on their level of familiarity and trust. I have been confident that some SpAds have spoken with the full voice of the Secretary of State, sharing likely views and responses in a way that have helped me shape advice and consider potential challenges. Others less so. It takes time to understand the nature of that relationship and any civil servant giving regular advice to Ministers would do well to invest in understanding the SpAds as well.
Third, there is a grey area between SpAd and official that has become increasingly common in my time in the civil service — that of a Ministerial policy adviser, a civil servant whose job is to act as a gatekeeper to Ministers. These people are civil servants and enjoy the benefits that brings in terms of remaining in role between different Ministers and even Governments, yet work closely with Ministers to help shape and deliver policy, giving them a power that I don’t think has yet to be fully appreciated or defined. Although in theory civil servants and therefore not subject to Ministerial whims, in practice these policy advisers work on a much more personal basis with Ministers and are closer to SpAds in some regards. The one crucial difference is that they are not there to give political advice.
At their best SpAds and Ministerial advisers can be a crucial part of developing effective policy advice, acting as a bridge between the dry analysis of the official and the political pressures facing Ministers to create advice that is practicable. At their worst, SpAds and Ministerial advisers can be whimsical, ignorant, self-promoting, bullying, and destructive, blocking advice that doesn’t suit their ends and creating unhelpful additional processes that stymie both Ministers and officials.
In the next blog of this series I will consider the difference between policy and administration.
